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Rising juvenile crime rates during the 1970s and 1980s spurred state legislatures across the 
country to exclude or transfer a significant share of offenders under the age of eighteen to the 
jurisdiction of the criminal court, essentially redrawing the boundary between the juvenile  
and adult justice systems. Jeffrey Fagan examines the legal architecture of the new boundary-
drawing regime and how effective it has been in reducing crime.
The juvenile court, Fagan emphasizes, has always had the power to transfer juveniles to the 
criminal court. Transfer decisions were made individually by judges who weighed the compet-
ing interests of public safety and the possibility of rehabilitating young offenders. This author-
ity has now been usurped by legislators and prosecutors. The recent changes in state law have 
moved large numbers of juveniles into the adult system. As many as 25 percent of all juvenile 
offenders younger than eighteen, says Fagan, are now prosecuted in adult court. Many live in 
states where the age boundary between juvenile and criminal court has been lowered to sixteen 
or seventeen. 
The key policy question is: do these new transfer laws reduce crime? In examining the research 
evidence, Fagan finds that rates of juvenile offending are not lower in states where it is rela-
tively more common to try adolescents as adults. Likewise, juveniles who have been tried as 
adults are no less likely to re-offend than their counterparts who have been tried as juveniles. 
Treating juveniles as adult criminals, Fagan concludes, is not effective as a means of crime 
control. 
Fagan argues that the proliferation of transfer regimes over the past several decades calls into 
question the very rationale for a juvenile court. Transferring adolescent offenders to the criminal 
court exposes them to harsh and sometimes toxic forms of punishment that have the perverse 
effect of increasing criminal activity. The accumulating evidence on transfer, the recent decrease 
in serious juvenile crime, and new gains in the science of adolescent development, concludes  
Fagan, may be persuading legislators, policymakers, and practitioners that eighteen may yet 
again be the appropriate age for juvenile court jurisdiction.
www.futureofchildren.org
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At the outset of the juvenile court more than a century ago, juvenile court judges were given the option to expel cases and transfer them to criminal 
court. Transfer was an essential and neces-
sary feature of the institutional architecture 
of the new juvenile court. Indeed, transfer 
helped maintain the court’s legitimacy by 
removing hard cases that challenged the 
court’s comparative advantage in dealing with 
young offenders—cases that critics could use 
to launch attacks on the court’s efficacy and 
therefore its core jurisprudential and social 
policy rationales. 
Unlike today, though, hard cases in the early 
years of the juvenile court did not necessar-
ily involve children charged with murder or 
other violence. Rather, the youth who were 
expelled more often were thought to be 
“incorrigible”—repetitive delinquents whose 
failure to respond to the court’s therapeutic 
regime signaled the intractability of their 
developmental and social deficits.1 Such cases 
negated the theory of the court: these youth’s 
repeated failures to respond to treatment 
canceled their eligibility for protection from 
the harmful regimes of criminal punishment. 
In fact, for more than five decades, juveniles 
charged with murder were more likely than 
not to be retained in the juvenile court, ben-
eficiaries of both its diversionary and stigma 
avoidance rationales.2 
During these years, decisions to transfer 
youth to criminal court were made routinely 
and almost exclusively by juvenile court 
judges with little attention or scrutiny from 
legislators, advocates, scholars, or the press. 
Their decisions were individualized to the 
unique factors for each youth. That is, judges 
decided which youth were immature and 
“amenable to treatment” on a case-by-case 
basis. In some instances, transfer decisions 
were based on the severity of the offense, 
where principles of proportionality—the 
requirement that the punishment fit the 
crime—trumped collateral considerations  
that might have otherwise mitigated the case 
for transfer. 
These procedures lasted for decades, until 
1966, when the U.S. Supreme Court in Kent 
v. U.S. identified constitutionally sanctioned 
standards, criteria, and procedures governing 
decisions by the juvenile court to waive its 
jurisdiction over the offending adolescent.3 
Signs of “maturity” and “sophistication” in 
the crime were important parts of the Kent 
calculus, signaling to the judge that the young 
offender posed a danger for further crimes. 
Adolescents who were deemed “amenable 
to treatment” were retained in the juvenile 
court. In deciding whom to waive to the 
criminal court and whom to retain in the 
juvenile court, judges relied heavily on the 
evaluations of social work professionals whose 
recommendations on waiver were usually 
persuasive and authoritative to the court. 
Kent was decided during the mid-1960s,  
when both juvenile and adult crime began to 
spike in the United States. In reaction to the 
sharp rise in crime, many states began in the 
mid-1970s to redesign the laws and revise the 
philosophy that had long shaped the boundary 
between juvenile and criminal courts. Popular 
reactions to rising crime and violence shaped 
the social and political context of the restruc-
turing, a process that continued through the 
late 1990s, when juvenile crime began a 
decade-long decline. As adolescents came 
increasingly to be feared as perpetrators of 
the most serious and violent crimes, the 
principles of rehabilitation that were essential 
to the juvenile court were largely abandoned.4 
Judicial discretion was weakened. In some 
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states, judicial authority was replaced with 
politically designed sentencing structures that 
fixed punishment to crime seriousness.5 In 
other states, the decision whether to try a 
juvenile as an adult was either shifted to the 
prosecutor or was made by legislators who 
carved out large groups of youth who were 
excluded from the juvenile court.
Demands for dismantling the juvenile court’s 
judicially centered waiver regime focused on 
four issues: inconsistencies and disparities 
from one case to the next, racial biases, 
insensitivity by judges to the seriousness of 
adolescent crimes, and rising rates of serious 
juvenile crime that signaled the failure of the 
juvenile court and corrections to control youth 
crime.6 The critiques motivated state legisla-
tures across the country to remove judicial 
discretion by disqualifying large sectors of the 
juvenile court population—children as young 
as ten years of age—and removing them to 
the jurisdiction of the criminal court.7 The 
result was a recurring cycle of legislation, 
starting in 1978 and lasting for more than two 
decades, that redrew the boundaries between 
juvenile and adult court. State legislators 
passed new laws and revised old ones, steadily 
expanding the criteria for transfer to the 
criminal court and punishment as an adult.8 
In effect, the legislatures decided that adoles-
cent offenders had become criminally culpable 
and more dangerous at younger ages than 
they were in the past. 
This cycle of legislation also reassigned—from 
juvenile court judges to prosecutors, criminal 
court judges, legislators, and correctional pro-
fessionals—a large share of the discretion over 
the types of cases to be transferred. Today, 
decisions about court jurisdiction sometimes 
are made in a retail process repeated daily in 
juvenile courts or prosecutors’ offices; at other 
times, corrections officials may decide which 
youth can be released early and which will 
serve the balance of long prison sentences; 
and at other times, the choice is made in a 
wholesale legislative process by elected offi-
cials far removed from the everyday workings 
of the juvenile courts. 
These choices involve not just two very 
different court systems, but deeply held 
assumptions about the nature of youth crime, 
about the blameworthiness of youth who 
commit crimes, and about how society should 
reconcile the competing concerns of public 
safety, victim rights, and youth development. 
The two courts have sharply contrasting ideas 
about adolescents who break the law—their 
immaturity and culpability, whether they can 
be treated or rehabilitated, the security 
threats they pose, and the punishment they 
might deserve. Whatever the motivation, 
sending an adolescent offender to the 
criminal court is a serious and consequential 
step. It is an irreversible decision that exposes 
young lawbreakers to harsh and sometimes 
toxic forms of punishment that, as the 
empirical evidence shows, have the perverse 
effect of increasing criminal activity.9 
Nearly four decades after Kent and three 
decades after this restructuring began, it is 
now possible to look at the results of this 
large-scale experiment in youth and crime-
control policy. In this article I examine the 
new boundaries of the juvenile court from 
three different perspectives. The first per-
spective is doctrinal or statutory: what is  
the legal architecture of the new boundary-
drawing and boundary-maintenance regimes? 
The second perspective is conceptual and 
jurisprudential: what are the justifications for 
the adult punishment of juvenile offenders, 
and what do the new boundaries signal about 
popular views on youth crime, about the 
appropriate responses to such crime, and 
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about the theory of a juvenile court stripped 
of its most challenging cases? The third 
perspective involves policy. Looking at the 
new boundaries from a policy perspective 
requires assessing empirical evidence on the 
reach, consequences, and effectiveness of 
relocating entire groups of juvenile offenders 
and offenses to the criminal court. After 
revisiting the jurisprudential and policy issues 
that are the heart of this debate, I look to the 
future of law and policy regulating the upper 
boundary of the juvenile court.
Statutory Architecture of  
Juvenile Transfer 
In the midst of the 1978 New York guberna-
torial election, a fifteen-year-old named Willie 
Bosket shot three strangers on a New York 
City subway platform.10 The horrific murder 
evoked a fierce legislative response. The 
traditionally shorter sentences in the juvenile 
court for dangerous young men like Willie 
became the focus of widespread outrage and, 
quickly, political action. New York legislators 
promptly passed the Juvenile Offender Law,11 
which lowered the age of majority for murder 
to thirteen and to fourteen for other major 
felonies. The new law signaled a broad attack 
on the structure and independence of the 
juvenile court, a major restructuring of the 
border between juvenile and criminal court 
that was repeated across the nation in recur-
ring cycles for more than two decades.
Current Boundary-Drawing Regimes
At its birth, the Juvenile Offender Law was, 
and remains today, the nation’s toughest law 
on juvenile crime. New York State was 
already tough on juvenile crime, one of three 
states in the nation where the age of majority 
was sixteen.12 Two years earlier, it had passed 
the Predicate Felony Law, a measure that 
mandated minimum terms of confinement 
for serious juvenile offenders in juvenile 
corrections facilities.13 Determinacy in 
sentencing—that is, introducing certainty 
both in sentence length and in conditions— 
was nothing new for adults, but this law was 
the first of its kind for juveniles.14 But the JO 
Law, as it came to be known, trumped the 
Predicate Felony Law in ways that signaled 
the trend that was to come. 
First, the legislative branch itself assumed 
transfer authority by excluding entire cat-
egories of juvenile offenders and offenses 
from the jurisdiction of the family court and 
removing them to the criminal court.15 The 
lawmakers could simply have curtailed the 
discretion of family court judges, but the 
JO Law foreclosed any role for them. One 
reading of the law, then, was as an attack on 
the family court and its deep adherence to 
the principles of individualized justice and 
“best interests of the child.” The JO Law not 
only stripped transfer authority from family 
court judges, but also devolved it to police 
and prosecutors, whose unreviewable deci-
sions about charging young offenders often 
determined whether cases met the thresholds 
that would trigger a transfer.16
Second, the new law based the transfer deci-
sion solely on age and offense. It accorded no 
weight to culpability, mitigation, or any other 
individual factor, including either therapeu-
tic needs or prior record. It assumed that all 
youth in these age-offense categories were 
both sufficiently culpable as to merit criminal 
justice sanctions and likely to continue their 
criminal behavior regardless of any interven-
tions provided for them in juvenile correc-
tions. In effect, the legislators made an actuari-
al group prediction of future dangerousness.
Third, the new law made sentences for Juve-
nile Offenders, the label applied to juveniles 
whose cases were removed by the law, long 
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Table 1. Transfer Mechanisms by State, 2003












Total states 45 15 15 15 29 25 34 15 17
Alabama X X X
Alaska X X X X
Arizona X X X X X
Arkansas X X X X X
California X X X X X X X
Colorado X X X X X X
Connecticut X X X
Delaware X X X X X
District of Columbia X X X X
Florida X X X X X
Georgia X X X X X
Hawaii X X
Idaho X X X X
Illinois X X X X X X X X
Indiana X X X X
Iowa X X X X X
Kansas X X X X
Kentucky X X X X
Louisiana X X X X
Maine X X X
Maryland X X X X
Massachusetts X X X
Michigan X X X X X
Minnesota X X X X X
Mississippi X X X X
Missouri X X X
Montana X X X X
Nebraska X X X
Nevada X X X X X
New Hampshire X X X
New Jersey X X X
New Mexico X X X
New York X X
North Carolina X X X
North Dakota X X X X
Ohio X X X X
Oklahoma X X X X X X
Oregon X X X X
Pennsylvania X X X X X
Rhode Island X X X X X
South Carolina X X X
South Dakota X X X X
Tennessee X X X
Texas X X X
Utah X X X X
Vermont X X X X X
Virginia X X X X X X
Washington X X X
West Virginia X X X
Wisconsin X X X X X
Wyoming X X X
Source: Patrick Griffin, Trying and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer and Blended Sentencing Laws (Pitts-
burgh: National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2003).
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enough to require trans-correctional place-
ments—placements that began in juvenile 
settings and continued into the adult correc-
tions system. Thus the law not only mandated 
transfers but made them routine, a move that 
affected large numbers of younger offenders 
who were sentenced to lengthy prison terms 
despite the absence of a prior record.
In the next two decades, every state in the 
nation passed legislation to ease and expand 
the prosecution of juveniles in adult courts.17 
The watershed year was 1995, when seventeen 
states expanded eligibility for transfer.18 Most 
states supplanted or eclipsed the traditional 
system of judicial transfer from the juvenile 
court using one or more of the mechanisms 
built into the design of the JO Law. Still other 
laws created a new statutory authority to 
transfer not court jurisdiction but correctional 
jurisdiction, and ceded that authority to a 
forum that is more administrative than 
adjudicative.19 Some states maintained the 
structure and primacy of judicial waiver, but 
increased the number of youth being waived 
by mandating that waiver be considered for 
some offense and offender categories and 
shifting the burden of proof from the prosecu-
tion to the defense to show why the accused 
should not be transferred to the criminal 
court.
Given its scope and reach, the expansion of 
transfer for juvenile offenders was a massive 
social and legal experiment that fundamen-
tally transformed the borders and boundaries 
of the juvenile justice system. The experiment 
evolved and strengthened over time: once 
passed, laws often were re-crafted in recur-
ring legislative sessions to further expand the 
scope of laws to transfer or remove youth to 
criminal court at lower ages and for more 
offenses. As I show below, the experiment 
took on several unique forms.
Mechanisms for Juvenile Transfer
Table 1 arrays the states on each of the 
mechanisms of juvenile transfer in effect as 
of 2004. Judicial waiver, statutory exclusion, 
direct file, and blended sentencing are the 
mechanisms used to transfer juvenile offend-
ers to adult court. 
Judicial waiver. Judicial waiver to criminal 
court is the most common transfer mecha-
nism: forty-seven states and the District of 
Columbia provide judicial discretion to waive 
certain juveniles to criminal court. Table 
2 shows the age and offense thresholds of 
waiver eligibility for each state. Historically, 
judicial waiver decisions were made following 
a motion by prosecutors. Evidence was pre-
sented and argued, and a decision was made. 
In 1966, in Kent v. U.S.,20 the Supreme Court 
articulated both procedural and substantive 
standards to regulate judicial waiver deci-
sions. Though only advisory in the original 
Kent case, the Kent guidelines quickly were 
adopted into law in most states.
Since 1978, judicial waiver criteria and pro-
cedures have been redesigned in many states 
to increase the likelihood of waiver. Some 
states created a presumption of waiver for 
specific offenses or offenders, based on age, 
offense, or prior record. Presumptive waiver 
shifts the burden of proof from the state to 
the juvenile to show that he or she should not 
be transferred. Other states mandate waiver 
for specific categories of offenses and offend-
ers, often to ensure sentencing terms that can 
take place only in the criminal court.
Statutory exclusion. Statutory exclusions, like 
New York’s JO Law, relocate entire categories 
of youth defined by age or offense criteria, or 
both, to the criminal court. More than half of 
the states have statutes that exclude some 
adolescent offenders from the juvenile court. 
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Table 2. Eligibility for Judicial Waiver by State, Age, and Offense Type, 2003
Any Certain Capital Person Property Drug Weapons




Arkansas 14 14 14 14 14
California 16
Colorado 12 12 12
Delaware NS
District of Columbia 16 15 NS
Florida 14
Georgia 15 13 13
Hawaii 14 NS
Idaho 14 NS NS NS NS NS
Illinois 13












New Hampshire 15 13 13
New Jersey 14 14 14 14 14 14
North Carolina 13
North Dakota 16 14
Ohio 14
Oklahoma NS
Oregon 15 NS NS 15
Pennsylvania 14
Rhode Island 16 NS
South Carolina 16 14 NS NS 14 14
South Dakota NS
Tennessee 16 NS NS
Texas 14 14 14
Utah 14
Vermont 10 10 10
Virginia 14
Washington NS
West Virginia NS NS NS NS NS
Wisconsin 15 14 14 14 14 14
Wyoming 13
Note: An entry in the column below an offense category means that there is some offense or offenses in that category for which a 
juvenile may be waived for criminal prosecution. The number indicates the youngest possible age at which a juvenile accused of an 
offense in that category may be waived. “NS” means no age restriction is specified for an offense in that category.
Example: In Tennessee, a juvenile may be waived for criminal prosecution of any offense committed after reaching the age of sixteen 
(Any offense—16). In addition, a juvenile of any age may be waived for prosecution of first- or second-degree murder or attempted 
first- or second-degree murder (Murder—NS). Finally, a juvenile of any age may be waived for prosecution of rape, aggravated rape, 
aggravated or especially aggravated robbery, kidnapping, aggravated or especially aggravated kidnapping, or the attempt to commit any 
of these offenses (Person offense—NS).
Source: Patrick Griffin, Trying and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer and Blended Sentencing Laws (Pitts-
burgh: National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2003).
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Table 3 shows the age and offense threshold 
for statutory exclusion in each of those states. 
In addition to devolving transfer authority to 
prosecutors and police, these statutes also 
moot Kent by rendering a legislative judgment 
about the future behavior and malleability of 
excluded youth. Exclusions vary from specific 
offenses, as in New York, to any felony offense 
at the age of seventeen, as in Mississippi. 
Concurrent jurisdiction and direct file. 
Concurrent jurisdiction gives prosecutors the 
option and discretion to file cases directly  
in adult court. Fifteen states have created 
concurrent juvenile and criminal court 
jurisdiction for specific categories of offenses 
and offenders, permitting prosecutors to 
elect the judicial forum for the adjudica- 
tion and sentencing of the young offender. 
Table 4 shows the combinations of offense 
and age criteria that trigger eligibility for 
concurrent jurisdiction in each state. A quick 
glance shows that these statutes are targeted 
primarily at violent crimes. Most states with 













Alabama 16 16 16
Alaska 15 16
Arizona 15 15 15
California 14 14
Delaware 15
Florida 16 NS 16 16
Georgia 13 13
Idaho 14 14 14 14
Illinois 15 13 15 15 15
Indiana 16 16 16 16 16
Iowa 16 16 16
Louisiana 15 15




Montana 17 17 17 17 17
Nevada 16* NS NS 16
New Mexico 15







Vermont 14 14 14
Washington 16 16 16
Wisconsin 10 NS
Note: An entry in the column below an offense category means that there is some offense or offenses in that category that are 
excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction. The number indicates the youngest possible age at which a juvenile accused of an offense in 
that category is subject to the exclusion. “NS” means no age restriction is specified for an offense in that category.
Source: Patrick Griffin, Trying and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer and Blended Sentencing Laws (Pitts-
burgh: National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2003).
*In Nevada, the exclusion applies to any juvenile with a previous felony adjudication, regardless of the current offense charged, if the 
current offense involves the use or threatened use of a firearm.
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concurrent jurisdiction make youth eligible at 
age fourteen, though others have either lower 
or higher age thresholds for specific crimes.
Blended sentencing. Seventeen states give the 
criminal court the power to impose contin-
gent criminal sanctions for juveniles convicted 
of certain serious crimes; fifteen states permit 
juvenile courts to do the same; many give the 
power to either court. These statutes, known 
as blended sentencing statutes or extended 
jurisdiction statutes, identify a specific group 
of juveniles—based on age, offense, and prior 
record—whose sentences have separate 
juvenile and adult components that are linked 
through a contingent process to determine 
whether the extended (criminal) punishment 
will be carried out.21 Typically, the adult 
component is imposed only if the youth 
violates the provisions of the juvenile portion 
or commits a new offense. The conditions in 
the juvenile phase may be narrowly tailored 
(for example, avoiding subsequent crime) or 
vague and subjective (for example, making 
satisfactory “progress” in treatment). Table 5 
shows the offense and age criteria for blended 
sentencing in the states with such provisions. 
Two states, Vermont and Kansas, permit 
blended sentences for any offense for youth 
beginning at age ten. Many other states have 
no minimum age for one or more of the 
eligible offense categories.
Although intended to ameliorate the con-
sequences of transfer and waiver, blended 
sentencing in practice has raised several 
issues. First is net widening. In Minnesota, 
for example, blended sentences did not 
Table 4. State Array of Concurrent Jurisdiction Statutes Permitting Direct File by Prosecutor  

















Arkansas 16 14 14 14
California 14 14 14 14 14 14
Colorado 14 14 14 14 14
District of Columbia 16 16 16
Florida 16 16 NS 14 14 14 14
Georgia NS
Louisiana 15 15 15 15
Michigan 14 14 14 14 14
Montana 12 12 16 16 16
Nebraska 16 NS
Oklahoma 16 15 15 15 16 15
Vermont 16 1
Virginia 14 14
Wyoming 14 14 14 14
Note: An entry in the column below an offense category means that there is some offense or offenses in that category that may be 
handled in juvenile or criminal court at the prosecutor’s option. The number indicates the youngest possible age at which a juvenile 
accused of an offense in that category is subject to criminal prosecution at the prosecutor’s option. “NS” means no age restriction is 
specified for an offense in that category.
Example: Wyoming provides for concurrent jurisdiction of the following offenses committed by fourteen-year-olds: any felony committed 
by a juvenile with at least two previous felony adjudications (Certain felonies—14); murder or manslaughter (Murder—14); kidnapping, 
first- or second-degree sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, or aircraft high-jacking (Person offense—14); first- or second-
degree arson and aggravated burglary (Property offense—14).
Source: Patrick Griffin, Trying and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer and Blended Sentencing Laws (Pitts-
burgh: National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2003).
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reduce the number of waivers; instead, they 
were given to youth who in the past were sen-
tenced within the juvenile system.22 Second, 
the decision to activate the adult portion of 
the transitional sentence often lacks proce-
dural safeguards and at times lacks account-
ability. States vary on whether the decision  
is judicial or administrative, as well as on the 
evidence necessary to trigger the adult por- 
tion of the sentence, on the standard of proof, 
on whether youth can contest or rebut the 
evidence against them, on whether they are 
entitled to representation, and on whether 
the decision is reviewable. Given the length 
and conditions of the adult portion of the 
sentence, a more formal, standardized, and 
constitutionally sound procedure would be 
appropriate and consistent with the principles 
of Gault and McKiever.
Competing Instincts and  
Second Thoughts
The complexity of state laws, the piecemeal 
character of the statutory landscape, and the 
fact that most states have overlapping transfer 
mechanisms suggests some ambivalence 
about the instincts to get tough by imposing 
criminal sanctions on adolescents. Certainly, a 
state that really wanted to crack down on 
juveniles could simply lower its age of major-
ity. Yet throughout this thirty-year interval of 
increasingly tougher sanctions for adolescent 
offenders, only two states—Wisconsin and 
New Hampshire—have done so, lowering the 
age of majority from seventeen to sixteen.23 
Between 1989 and 1995, five states abolished 
the juvenile death penalty, far more than the 
number of states that lowered the age of 
majority in the same period.24 And one 
Note: An entry in the column below an offense category means that there is some offense or offenses in that category for which a 
juvenile may receive a blended sentence in juvenile court. The number indicates the youngest possible age at which a juvenile com-
mitting an offense in that category is subject to blended sentencing. “NS” means no age restriction is specified for an offense in that 
category.
*Statute types are coded “I” for inclusive, “E” for exclusive, and “C” for contiguous.
†Vermont has an anomalous juvenile blended sentencing provision, which permits a juvenile entering a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere in a criminal proceeding to petition for transfer to family court for disposition. Following the transfer, the family court must 
impose both a juvenile disposition and a suspended criminal sentence. However, there is no minimum age/offense threshold for 
juvenile blended sentencing in such a case—the provision applies to all juveniles transferred from criminal court for Youthful Offender 
Disposition.
Source: Patrick Griffin, Trying and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer and Blended Sentencing Laws (Pitts-
burgh: National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2003).



















Arkansas I 14 NS 14 14
Colorado C NS NS
Connecticut I 14 NS
Illinois I 13
Kansas I 10
Massachusetts I 14 14 14
Michigan I NS NS NS NS NS NS
Minnesota I 14
Montana I 12 NS NS NS NS NS
New Mexico E 14 14 14 14
Ohio I 10 10
Rhode Island C NS
Texas C NS NS NS NS
Vermont I†
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state—Connecticut—recently raised its age of 
majority from sixteen to eighteen.
Instead, the states have criminalized delin-
quency incrementally and in pieces, stopping 
short of the more obvious and expedient step 
of lowering the age of majority. The current 
statutory landscape is full of trapdoors and 
loopholes that allow some youth—no one 
knows exactly how many—to escape the reach 
of the criminal law and its harsher punish-
ments. Legislators appear ambivalent, 
refusing to completely abandon the principles 
of juvenile justice, yet seeking to divide 
delinquents into two categories: those worthy 
of the remedial and therapeutic interventions 
of the juvenile court and those who can be 
abandoned to the punitive regime of criminal 
justice in the name of retribution and public 
safety.
Two collateral provisions of the new transfer 
mechanisms illustrate these competing 
instincts about adolescence, youth crime, and 
juvenile justice. Viewed together, they 
suggest an ambivalent political and social 
culture on how tough to get with adolescent 
criminals. The first provision is reverse 
waiver, the return of transferred cases back to 
the juvenile court. Reverse waiver is a retail 
corrective mechanism, designed to detect 
errors in attributing full culpability or over-
looking evidence of amenability to treatment. 
Twenty-four states permit reverse waiver 
once cases have been initiated in the criminal 
courts, including twenty-one of the states 
with direct file (or prosecutorial waiver) 
statutes.25 In some states with statutory 
exclusion, such as Pennsylvania, these 
decertification hearings are routine.26 In New 
York City, nearly one-third of youth excluded 
by statute from family court are returned 
there by the adult court.27 Cases can be 
returned to the juvenile court either for 
adjudication and sentencing or only for 
sentencing within its statutory authority. 
The opposite instinct is evident in the thirty-
one states that have enacted “once waived, 
always waived” legislation. In these states, 
juveniles who have been waived to adult 
court and convicted subsequently must be 
charged in criminal court regardless of the of-
fense. For example, in Virginia, any juvenile 
previously convicted as an adult is forever 
excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction. In 
California, any youth whose case is waived to 
criminal court qualifies for permanent waiver, 
regardless of whether he or she is convicted 
in the first waived case. Permanent waiver 
can be invoked in ten states, and must be 
invoked in twelve others, if the offender pre-
viously has been adjudicated delinquent.
Thus, the punitive and child-saver instincts 
for youth crime co-exist uneasily in the cur-
rent statutory environment, forcing a binary 
choice between criminal and juvenile court 
jurisdiction, a choice that is not well suited to 
reconcile these tensions. 
The Enduring Importance of Maturity 
and Development in Juvenile Justice
What, then, do twenty-five years of transfer 
activism signal about legal and popular 
notions of the culpability and maturity of 
adolescents and about the place of develop-
mental considerations in juvenile justice? The 
political discourse and legal mobilization that 
animated the criminalization push beginning 
in the 1970s was ambiguous about maturity. 
From the outside, legal academics read the 
movement as a sign that legislators assumed 
that young offenders have reached a develop-
mental threshold of criminal responsibility 
that makes them fully culpable for their 
crimes.28 Indeed, even the Kent regulations 
confused “sophistication of the crime” with 
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“maturity” and culpability. Critics of the 
juvenile court argued that proportionality and 
the concerns of victims should trump the 
“best interests of the child.” Some argued 
that proportionality was necessary to maintain 
the legitimacy of the juvenile court.29 Others 
recommended a proportionality regime in  
the interests of fairness and consistency, 
deemphasizing but not discarding the notions 
of immaturity and diminished culpability of 
adolescents.30 Public safety concerns also 
loomed large, with proponents wishing to 
draw hard lines to determine when longer, 
incapacitating punishments were needed to 
protect citizens. Still other critics of the 
juvenile court preferred the deterrent effects 
of criminal court punishment over a regime 
of individualized justice. The notion of 
immaturity as a culpability discount was set 
aside or standardized in a complex heuristic 
of when and for whom transfer is necessary.
Accordingly, the transfer activism of the past 
two decades did not affirmatively or uni-
formly reject the notion of developmental  
immaturity and diminished culpability of 
youth. In many instances, it merely reserved  
it for less serious or visible offenders. 
Functionally, though not explicitly, transfer 
activism assumes that adolescents are no 
different from adults in the capacities that 
comprise maturity and hence culpability. It 
also assumes that adolescents have the same 
competencies as adults to understand and 
meaningfully participate in criminal pro-
ceedings. In the absence of good social and 
behavioral science, legislators were free to 
make those assumptions. 
But as Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Stein-
berg show in their article in this volume, there 
are good reasons now to doubt these claims.31 
For example, in Roper v. Simmons,32 the 2005 
U.S. Supreme Court decision banning 
execution of adolescents younger than 
eighteen who commit capital murder, the 
Court took notice that juveniles are less 
culpable because they are “more vulnerable 
and susceptible to negative peer influences 
and outside pressures, including peer 
pressure,”33 and are “comparatively immature, 
reckless and irresponsible.”34 The sum of 
these developmental gaps between adoles-
cents and adults, according to the Roper 
majority, “. . . means it is less supportable to 
conclude that even a heinous crime commit-
ted by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably 
depraved character.” 35 
The Roper court drew both from social 
science research and from “anatomically-
based” evidence of “concrete differences” 
between juveniles and adults showing that 
“critical developmental changes in key brain 
regions occur only after late adolescence.” 36 
So behavioral science and natural science 
are nearly perfectly aligned to show that “the 
average adolescent cannot be expected to 
act with the same control or foresight as a 
mature adult.” 37 
The new science of juvenile culpability runs 
counter to the patterns in transfer law. In 
transfer law, the downward ratcheting of 
the age at which youth are exposed to adult 
punishment is sharply at odds with evidence 
While the law moves toward 
waiving increasingly younger  
teens into criminal court, 
social and biological evidence 
suggests moving in the  
other direction.
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that full maturity in culpability and blame-
worthiness comes later than eighteen, not 
earlier. The recent push to lower the age 
threshold for treating juvenile offenders 
as adults assumes that they are sufficiently 
mature to be held culpable for their crimes, 
that any deficits in their maturity are minor 
compared with the harm they have done, and 
that unless punished harshly, they are likely to 
offend again. The new scientific evidence on 
developmentally constrained choices suggests 
that the law has been moving in the wrong 
direction.38
The new developmental and neuropsycholog-
ical research has strong implications for laws 
that funnel adolescents wholesale into the 
adult courts. The new evidence casts reason-
able doubt on statutes that sweep all four-
teen-, fifteen-, or sixteen-year-old offenders 
into the criminal justice system. Some adoles-
cent offenders may have reached a threshold 
of maturity by age sixteen consistent with the 
legal conceptions of maturity-culpability, but 
many others have not. In legal regimes that 
assume maturity where it simply does not 
exist, the new evidence on immaturity, both 
in the capacities that comprise culpability and 
the brain functions that launch them, argues 
persuasively against transfer to the criminal 
court. 
The alternative to wholesale transfer is to rely 
on case-by-case assessments, much as the 
early juvenile courts did in deciding which 
youth were so incorrigible as to warrant 
expulsion from the juvenile court. Yet given 
the limitations of prediction, one might worry 
about the accuracy of such assessments.39 
Developmental variability means that the 
younger the line for eligibility for criminal 
punishment is drawn, the greater the risk of 
error.40 So, for example, the new science 
should raise strong cautions about laws that 
draw the line at age twelve or younger. One 
can hardly expect legislators, prosecutors, and 
judges to systematically and accurately make 
these complex judgments for young adoles-
cents.41 Getting it wrong has serious costs. 
Waiver to adult court is not exactly a death 
sentence, but it often is irreversible and has 
serious consequences, as I show next, both for 
adolescents and for public safety. While the 
law moves toward waiving increasingly 
younger teens into criminal court, social and 
biological evidence suggests moving in the 
other direction. 
The Reach of Transfer Law
The complexity of the statutory landscape 
challenges efforts to compile accurate and 
comprehensive estimates of the reach of 
transfer laws.42 Accurate tallies of the num-
ber of adolescents transferred to criminal 
court would require counts in state court 
administrative databases of the number of 
cases filed in the criminal court by age, race, 
and offense, plus data on their dispositions  
to determine how many transferred cases  
remain in criminal court after reverse waiver 
or judicial review. These data may exist, but 
they are highly disaggregated by state and, 
in some instances, exist only in local court 
records.
How Many Are Transferred?
Estimates of the number of youth tried and 
sentenced in the criminal courts are highly 
sensitive to data sources and methods of 
counting. Donna Bishop estimates that 
between 210,000 and 260,000 minors were 
prosecuted in criminal courts in 1996.43 Most 
of those (80 percent) were excluded from 
juvenile courts either by the statutory age 
boundary for juvenile court or by statutes that 
exclude specific categories of offenses and 
offenders. The Campaign for Youth Justice 
makes a similar estimate: 7,500 cases are 
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judicially waived to criminal court each year, 
27,000 are sent by direct file by a prosecutor, 
and 218,000 completely bypass the juvenile 
system and are sent by legislation that sets 
a lower age of adulthood than eighteen.44 
Comparing this figure with the estimated 
973,000 youth who received dispositions in 
the juvenile court in the same year, Bishop 
concludes that between 20 and 25 percent of 
all juvenile offenders younger than eighteen 
were processed in the criminal courts.
These figures are difficult to verify, however. 
For example, there are no comprehensive 
records of direct file activity by prosecutors. 
And records of minors prosecuted in criminal 
court are available only for samples from the 
nation’s largest counties and only for some 
years,45 or from surveys of prosecutors who 
report secondary data of uncertain reliability. 
These data sources are useful as lead indica-
tors of trends over time, but are not helpful in 
generating estimates of the number and rate 
of juvenile offenders in the criminal courts.
Although precise estimates may be elusive, it 
is possible to verify current estimates by 
aggregating other evidence. “Front-end 
statistics” on the number of youth judicially 
transferred suggest that traffic from juvenile 
to criminal court is heavy. For example, the 
National Center for Juvenile Justice exam-
ined judicial waiver between 1988 and 1999 
in more than 2,000 juvenile courts represent-
ing 70 percent of the U.S. population. Figure 
1 shows that the rate of waiver is low and, 
with two exceptions, stable over time. 
Approximately eight cases were waived for 
every 1,000 formally processed over the 
decade, fewer than 1 percent of all cases. 
Waiver rates peaked in 1992 at 1.6 percent of 
all cases and declined through the rest of the 
decade consistent with an overall decline in 
juvenile arrests. Person offenses were waived 
most often during the decade (1.1 percent of 
all formal cases), and property cases least 
often.46 Judicial waivers for drug offenses 
declined from a peak of 4 percent in 1991 to 
slightly more than 1 percent in 1999. Given 
the low frequency of judicial waivers, the 
attack on the autonomy of juvenile court 
judges to make waiver decisions is puzzling. 
These front-end statistics on waiver do not 
include juvenile transfers to criminal court via 
direct file or statutory exclusions, nor those 
Figure 1. Percent of Cases Judicially Waived to Adult Court, 1990–99
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minors (as in New York or other states with 
age limits below eighteen) who are automati-
cally considered adults by virtue of the state 
age of majority. Yet it is difficult to count these 
groups. Records often are not kept, and arrest 
data rarely differentiate the subchapters in 
penal codes that trigger statutory exclusion. 
“Back-end statistics” on youth serving sen-
tences in adult jails and prison illustrate the 
consequences of all transfer mechanisms. 
These data provide a different picture. The 
number of youth under age eighteen in adult 
jails rose sharply through the 1990s to a high 
of almost 9,500 in 1999 and then leveled off to 
an average of just over 7,200 since 2000. 
Figure 2 shows that between 1990 and 2004 
there was a 208 percent increase in the 
number of juveniles younger than eighteen 
serving time in adult jails on any given day. 
The share of youth under age eighteen among 
total jail populations, however, is dropping: 
these youth accounted for 1.4 percent of the 
total population of state jails in 1994, 1.2 
percent in 2000, and 1 percent in 2004.47
Figure 3 shows that the number of juveniles 
younger than eighteen admitted to state 
prisons nationally peaked in 1995 at approxi-
mately 7,500 and declined over the next 
seven years. The share of these youth among 
prison populations is also dropping. Youth 
under age eighteen accounted for 2.3 percent 
of the total population of state prisons in 
1996, more than double the share (1.1 
percent) in 2002. Since 1995, the total prison 
population has risen 16 percent, while the 
number of youth under age eighteen in 
prison has dropped 45 percent.48
Finally, in California, 6,629 youth were 
sentenced to the California Department of 
Corrections between 1989 and 2003 to serve 
sentences as adults.49 The average incarcera-
tion rate was 475 a year, but varied from a 
low of 172 in 1989 to a peak of 794 in 1997. 
In 2003, 504 minors were sentenced to adult 
prison in California. 
Together, these front- and back-end estimates 
suggest that the commonly cited estimate that 
210,000 youth a year are transferred to 
Figure 2. Number of State Jail Inmates under Age Eighteen, 1990–2004
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criminal court50 may be an upper bound. How 
much lower the estimate should be is difficult 
to determine, and any estimate is prone to 
error. What can be said is that there is sub-
stantial traffic between the juvenile and 
criminal courts, and most of it is one-way. And 
the consequences of transfer are severe. Each 
year tens of thousands of youth below age 
eighteen are newly incarcerated in prisons 
and jails, often together with adults, launching 
an experience whose irrevocable stigma 
clouds their future economic and social lives. 
By any measure, this is a large-scale social 
“experiment” in youth policy whose effects, as 
I show later, are anything but positive.
Race and Transfer
The overrepresentation of minority youth 
among those transferred is not surprising, 
given their overrepresentation at every stage 
of juvenile and criminal justice processing.51 
Whether minority youth are overrepresented 
relative to their crime rates, and especially 
relative to the types of crimes that are enu-
merated in many state transfer and exclusion 
laws, is a more complex question, but the bal-
ance of evidence suggests that they are. 52
Again, the picture of disparity varies at 
different stages in the juvenile and criminal 
justice systems. A back-end view, for example, 
suggests strong disparities among youth 
serving in prisons. In 1997, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics data showed that between 1985 and 
1997, 58 percent of the youth admitted to 
state prisons under eighteen years of age were 
black and 15 percent were Hispanic.53 The 
Campaign for Youth Justice54 cites data from 
the California Department of Corrections that 
in 2003, black youth were 4.7 times more 
likely to be transferred than white youth, and 
Hispanic youth 3.4 times more likely. These 
populations would include youth transferred 
judicially to criminal court, as well as those 
excluded by statute under Proposition 21. The 
same report cites Virginia Department of 
Corrections data from 2005 showing that 
black youth comprise less than 50 percent of 
youth arrested but more than 73 percent of 
youth entering adult prisons.
A front-end view suggests fewer disparities in 
waiver. For example, Charles Puzzanchera55 
reports that 46 percent of the judicially 
waived population during 1990–99 was 
non-white. Yet most analysts duck the question 
Figure 3. New Admissions of Youth under Age 18 to Adult Prisons, 1990–2002
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of whether waiver is racially disproportionate 
to race-specific crime or arrest rates. Instead, 
they more often compute race differences 
based on earlier stages of case processing, 
mooting the cumulative effects of how youth 
of different races enter the system. As part of 
the federal Disproportionate Minority 
Confinement program, Howard Snyder and 
Melissa Sickmund computed a Relative Rate 
Index to estimate disparities at each stage of 
juvenile justice processing. Table 6 repro-
duces the chart for 2002 from their most 
recent report. Large disparities between black 
and white youth are evident at arrest and at 
detention. Judicially waived cases show fewer 
disparities. But these data are misleading in 
two ways. First, they filter out cumulative 
disadvantages by race from the outset of a 
case in the juvenile court—decisions in 
charging, detention, charge reduction, and 
the decision to seek waiver itself—and look 
only at the decision to waive. This selective 
filtering, or “selection bias,” seriously limits 
understanding of race and waiver. Second, the 
judicial waiver data are likely underestimates 
that do not take into account youth excluded 
by statute from juvenile court jurisdiction.56 A 
more comprehensive data set used by Bishop, 
including data on all three routes of transfer,57 
reports that 69 percent of the tens of thou-
sands of youth excluded each year by statute 
are non-white. No estimate of racial differ-
ences in youth crime, apart from homicide, 
suggests that minority youth account for such 
a large share of crime.
Table 6. Index of Racial Disparity in the Juvenile Justice System, 2002
Source: H. Snyder and M. Sickmund, National Center for Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report (www.
ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/toc.html [September, 1999]).
Decision points White Black Relative rate index
Juvenile arrests 1,576,400 625,000
Cases referred to juvenile court 1,086,700 473,100
Cases detained 199,700 118,600
Cases petitioned 596,800 306,000
Cases judicially waived to criminal court 4,400 2,500
Cases adjudicated delinquent 421,400 179,000
Adjudicated cases resulting in placement 90,400 47,500
Rates (per 100)
Juvenile arrests to population* 6.1 11.5 1.9
Cases referred to juvenile arrests 68.9 75.6 1.1
Cases detained to cases referred 18.4 25.1 1.4
Cases petitioned to cases referred 54.9 64.7 1.2
Cases waived to cases petitioned 0.7 0.8 1.1
Cases adjudicated to cases petitioned 70.6 58.5 0.8
Placements to cases adjudicated 21.5 26.5 1.2
• For every 100 white youth ages ten to seventeen in the U.S. population, there were 6.1 arrests of white youth under age eighteen.
The rate for black youth was 11.5, yielding an RRI for the arrest decision of 1.9. The black rate was almost double the white rate.
• Except for the adjudication decision point, the RRI shows a degree of racial disparity for black youth. This disparity accumulates 
throughout the process, so that in the end, while black youth were 16 percent of the youth population and were involved in 28 percent 
of the arrests of youth in 2002, they accounted for 33 percent of the juvenile court cases that resulted in an out-of-home placement.
* Population ages ten to seventeen = 25,994,400 (white) and 5,431,300 (black).
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The Snyder and Sickmund report on judicial 
waiver also claims that race disparities are 
narrowing. The share of white defendant 
cases in juvenile court that were waived 
increased from 1990 to 1999 by 9 percent, 
while the share for black youth declined by 
24 percent. This decline, however, may be an 
artifact of the expansion of other pathways for 
transfer during this period, an expansion that 
may have disproportionately affected minority 
youth who were more often arrested for laws 
that were the targets of legislative activism.58
The real issue, though, is not whether dispari-
ties in waiver exist because minority youth 
are more often involved in crime or because 
they are arrested at disproportionately higher 
rates per crime than are white youth relative 
to their involvement in crime.59 Rather, the 
essential question about race and transfer is 
whether there is disparate treatment given 
the fact of contact with the juvenile or crimi-
nal court. We might expect more black youth 
to be judicially waived or in adult prison rela-
tive to white youth if their offending rates are 
higher. But disparity might better be viewed 
in terms of the balance across racial and 
ethnic groups in the rate of transfer relative 
to each group’s arrest rate, rather than their 
offending rate. This measure is akin to the 
ways that epidemiologists compute relative 
risk ratios given exposure to an agent. 
There are reasons to think that these ratios 
are not balanced and that racial dispari- 
ties in the incarceration of youth under age 
eighteen in state prisons cannot be explained 
simply by differences in offending. The racial 
disparities in incarceration are produced by 
the cumulative effects of an entanglement  
of discretionary processes at each stage of  
the juvenile and criminal justice process. 
Analysts consistently find evidence of selec-
tive enforcement that targets minorities well 
beyond what any difference in their crime 
rates might predict.60 A long line of studies 
shows how race influences police officers’  
decision making and judgment about suspi-
cion and dangerousness.61 Social science 
evidence also suggests the banal, common-
place, and normalized influence of racial 
biases in everyday case processing in the 
juvenile and criminal courts, much of it 
influenced by implicit biases.62 Either directly 
or through surrogates and substitutes such as 
clothing, demeanor, neighborhood, or other 
racialized cues, unconscious and conscious 
biases influence decisions about whom to 
arrest and how to charge and sentence them.
Evidence from other corners of criminal 
justice also shows the cumulative effects of 
racial bias, from which youth are not  
exempt.63 Both discretionary and statutory 
routes for youth to the criminal court pass 
through these gates. Accordingly, disparities 
in transfer are the product of a cumulative 
process that involves the systematic and 
cascading application of discretion across the 
juvenile and criminal justice systems, as well 
as in structural components created both by 
policy and law.
Either directly or through 
surrogates and substitutes 
such as clothing, demeanor, 
neighborhood, or other  
racialized cues, unconscious 
and conscious biases influence 
decisions about whom to  
arrest and how to charge  
and sentence them.
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The Punitive Reach of Transfer
Transfer statutes and policy typically are 
designed to increase the certainty, length, 
and severity of punishment. Leniency, or 
limits on penal proportionality, was one of the 
lightning rods for those hostile to the juvenile 
court who advocated for tougher measures 
for juvenile crime. The evidence, however, 
suggests that these advocates only partially 
achieved their goals and that they put in 
place a far more complex and contingent pat-
tern of sentencing and punishment than they 
might have anticipated.
Several studies illustrate the variability and 
contingencies in sentencing of transferred 
cases in the criminal courts. For example, 
Martin Roysher and Peter Edelman64 showed 
in the 1970s that sanctions were no more 
severe in criminal court than in juvenile court 
in the years immediately following passage  
of the JO Law in New York; in many cases, 
and in some upstate counties, sentences were 
less harsh. Over time, research in different 
locales by Kay Gillespie and Michael Norman, 
by Dean Champion, and by Barry Feld, all 
showed similar patterns.65 Contrary to the 
retributive intent of waiver, Marilyn Houghta-
lin and Larry Mays showed that juveniles  
are sanctioned less severely in criminal court 
than are their counterparts in juvenile court, 
through relatively lenient sanctions and higher 
case attrition.66 In 1984 Peter Greenwood and 
several colleagues offered several explana-
tions why adolescents might face more lenient 
sanctions in criminal court,67 and, based on 
recent studies in Florida, Minnesota, and 
New York, these explanations seem accurate 
today. Young offenders in criminal court may 
appear less threatening—physically smaller 
and younger, shorter criminal records—than 
their older counterparts with longer records. 
Moreover, even though juvenile records are 
unshielded legally in many jurisdictions, Barry 
Feld showed that the juvenile’s criminal his-  
tory often may be unavailable to the criminal 
court because of the functional and physical 
separation of juvenile and criminal court staffs 
who must compile and combine these records 
and, sometimes, because of sheer bureau-
cratic ineptitude.68 As a result, the same 
juvenile recidivist who appears incorrigible to 
the juvenile court may appear to the criminal 
court to be a less chronic and less serious 
offender. However, many states have removed 
these shields, and juvenile records are now 
routinely considered in criminal court.
But more recent studies show that the 
leniency gap has been reversed. In the Florida 
studies, Donna Bishop and her colleagues 
reported that youth charged with violent 
crimes were more likely to be incarcerated if 
sentenced in the adult court.69 Aaron Kupchik 
and several colleagues showed a similar 
pattern comparing structured sentencing of 
transferred youth in New York with discre-
tionary sentencing of youth in the juvenile 
court in New Jersey.70 In many jurisdictions, 
structured sentencing determines the disposi-
tion in criminal court: the seriousness of a 
young adult’s present offense and adult 
criminal history are the calculus of sentenc-
ing. This is one reason why nearly one-third of 
youth aged sixteen and seventeen in New 
York with no previous record were sentenced 
to adult prison under the New York JO Law.71 
This figure reflects the emphasis on violent 
crimes in expanded transfer laws and proce-
dures across the states. National trends on 
judicial waivers show that adolescents charged 
with and waived for violent crimes receive 
substantial sentences as adults.72 Local studies 
show the same. For example, Cary Rudman 
and several colleagues, looking only at 
adolescents charged with violent crimes in 
four jurisdictions, found that the criminal 
court was more punitive.73 The likelihood of 
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incarceration was the same in juvenile and 
criminal court, but juveniles waived to 
criminal court received longer sentences—
almost always in adult prisons—because there 
was no upper age boundary for incarceration. 
Barry Feld and Marcy Podkopacz found that 
waived youth in Minneapolis received longer 
sentences for violent crimes, but shorter 
sentences for property crime, than retained 
youth.74 Fagan, comparing sentences in New 
York and New Jersey for offenders aged 
fifteen and sixteen in 1981–82, found that 
youth adjudicated on robbery or assault in 
adult rather than juvenile court were more 
likely to be incarcerated and received longer 
sentences.75 But in a second study of juveniles 
sentenced five years later in the same two 
courts, the gap between juvenile and criminal 
court sanctions had narrowed significantly. 
Thus, the age-offense relationship appar-
ently produces a peculiar disjunction in the 
sentences of juveniles as adults. When sen-
tenced as adults, young property offenders 
may receive shorter sentences than do their 
juvenile counterparts, though young violent 
offenders may receive dramatically longer 
sentences and under more punitive condi-
tions than do their juvenile counterparts.
Comparative Correctional Experiences 
What little research there is on the correc-
tional experiences of transferred youth has 
focused on transferred youth who are locked 
up in state prisons. Little is known about 
the short stays of such youth in county jails. 
Nothing is known about how they experience 
probation supervision, including whether they 
are linked to services that can help them avoid 
a return to crime. Nor is anything known 
about how youth receiving blended sentences, 
or contingent punishment, experience their 
two-stage correctional stays. Likewise, for 
youth released from prison, little research 
charts their re-entry experiences and out-
comes. More research is needed about all 
these areas of transfer policy to fully under-
stand why transfer itself, not just the experi-
ences of the group that goes to adult prison, 
seems to produce worse outcomes.
As I show later, incarceration does explain the 
higher recidivism rates of transferred youth. 
Why should their correctional experiences 
matter? There are two reasons. The first is 
that the primary thrust of transfer laws was to 
increase the length and severity of punish-
ment. A serious assessment of transfer as a 
policy must engage its retributive component. 
One impulse behind transfer activism, fed by 
the popular perception that the juvenile 
court’s punishment tools were mismatched to 
the increasing severity of youth crime, was to 
challenge the juvenile court to attain propor-
tionality in the length and severity of its 
punishments. A careful analysis of transfer, 
then, should consider the quality of retribu-
tion and the possibility that, for adolescents, 
lengthy stays in harsh conditions of confine-
ment can be disfiguring, with unknown 
developmental costs. 
Comparisons of juvenile and adult correc-
tional settings suggest that youth in prisons 
face higher risks of violence. Martin Forst 
and several colleagues showed how the sharp 
policy and atmospheric differences between 
Few modern criminologists  
or correctional administrators 
maintain the illusion that 
incarceration has either  
broad therapeutic benefits  
or a strong deterrent effect.
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the security orientation in adult prisons and 
the therapeutic and educational orientations 
of juvenile facilities translate into serious 
consequences for safety and mental health.76 
They compared the experiences of 140 youth 
in adult and juvenile facilities over four 
locales. Youth in adult prisons reported 
higher rates of physical and sexual assault 
than did matched samples of youth in 
juvenile corrections. Using standardized 
scales, youth in juvenile settings reported that 
staff was more involved and helpful in social 
and behavioral services. They reported 
stronger educational programs and employ-
ment training and rated therapeutic case 
management services higher. They also noted 
that staff in the juvenile facilities were far 
more attentive to building and strengthening 
ties to family and other social networks that 
would be influential on release.77 Bishop and 
Frazier reported nearly identical responses in 
their Florida sample.
In a replication a decade later, Fagan and 
Kupchik found fewer differences in victim-
ization than did Forst and his colleagues.78 In 
fact, juvenile facilities appeared to be more 
chaotic, with higher levels of drug use and 
self-reported offending and victimization. But 
youth in adult prisons nevertheless felt less 
safe and reported significantly more symp-
toms of mental illness and post-traumatic 
stress disorder. Even in the more outwardly 
stable contexts of adult prisons, where the 
social organization is maintained by rigid 
inmate networks, the perceptions and con-
sequences of being surrounded by cohorts 
of older, often violent, inmates produced 
stronger feelings of insecurity and collateral 
mental health consequences.
A second reason why correctional experience 
should matter is one of principle. The correc-
tive component of punishment often is 
invoked to justify its effects, yet incarceration 
seems to have little correctional effect. Few 
modern criminologists or correctional admin-
istrators maintain the illusion that incarcera-
tion has either broad therapeutic benefits or a 
strong deterrent effect.79 Recidivism rates in 
adult prisons are simply too high—more than 
two prisoners in three released in 1994 
returned to prison within three years80—to 
sustain beliefs in either the rehabilitative or 
deterrent component of adult corrections. 
What is the principle, and corresponding 
youth policy, that mandates exposure to 
conditions that are likely to produce failure, a 
failure with perhaps lasting impacts on an 
adolescent’s social development and well-
being far into the life course? We already 
know that incarceration experiences in 
adolescence radically curtail social, economic, 
and psychological development over the life 
course.81 Do incapacitation or retribution 
concerns justify such costs? These policy goals 
tell us what to punish and perhaps whom, but 
they do not inform a policy of how to punish. 
The Public Safety Effects  
of Transfer Laws
Research on the deterrent effects of transfer 
on public safety focuses on both general and 
specific deterrence. Most of the evidence on 
general deterrence suggests that laws that 
increase the threat of sentencing and incar-
ceration as an adult have no effect on youth 
crime rates. Research on specific deterrence 
consistently finds that adolescent offenders 
transferred to criminal court have higher 
rates of re-offending than do those retained 
in juvenile court. Rarely do social scientists 
or policy analysts report such consistency and 
agreement under such widely varying sam-
pling, measurement, and analytic conditions. 
General Deterrence
Researchers investigating general deterrence 
102    THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN   
Jeffrey Fagan
typically estimate differences in rates of 
offending by adolescents under varying 
sanctioning and punishment regimes. Study 
designs to test general deterrent effects  
sort into two approaches. Most studies use 
time series methods, comparing crime rates 
before and after the passage of laws lower- 
ing the age of majority for specific categories 
of offenses and offenders. Others compare 
youth crime rates in states with different 
statutory boundaries for the age of majority. 
Both types of studies often use econometric 
models to compare age-specific crime rates 
for states with different age thresholds for 
criminal court eligibility, statistically control-
ling also for punishment contingencies and 
other covariates of crime and justice system 
performance. The evidence tips against the 
claim that youthful offenders are sensitive to 
the age boundaries that make them eligible 
for punishment in the criminal courts. The 
consensus cuts across studies that vary in 
study designs, time periods, locales, and 
methods of analysis. 
Most general deterrence studies find that  
offending rates among adolescents either  
remain unchanged or increase once they 
reach age-defined eligibility for the criminal 
court. Simon Singer and David McDowall 
reported no general deterrent effects when 
New York State passed the JO Law in 1978, 
despite widespread publicity and enforce-
ment of the law statewide.82 That finding is 
surprising, because young people in New 
York evidently were well aware of the law, a 
fundamental prerequisite for deterrence.83 
Nevertheless, the findings were mixed, espe-
cially among older cohorts of youth who were 
closer to the age of majority. The results were 
uneven across the state, as well, with little  
effect on youth crime rates in the higher-
crime areas, including New York City. 
Two other single-state studies—one in Idaho 
and one in Washington—reported similar 
findings. Eric Jensen and Linda Metsger used 
time series analysis to estimate differences 
in juvenile crime rates three years before 
and five years after Idaho passed a law that 
mandated transfer for youth aged fourteen 
to seventeen charged with any of five violent 
crimes. Juvenile crime rates in Idaho actually 
rose after the law was passed, while crime 
rates in neighboring states were declining.84 
Robert Barnowski used time series models  
to estimate changes in juvenile crime rates 
before and after passage of Washington’s 
1994 Violence Reduction Act and a 1997 
amendment expanding the law. He analyzed 
juvenile arrest rates for youth aged ten to 
seventeen from 1989 to 2000 and compared 
state trends with national trends. He found 
no differences in the two trends; juvenile 
arrest rates for the target crimes peaked in 
1994 for each.85 
Only one study, by Steven Levitt, reported 
that adolescent offenders are sensitive to the 
age boundary for adult punishment. Levitt 
estimated significantly lower age-specific 
crime rates for adolescents between 1978 and 
1993 in states where the age of majority was 
seventeen than in states where offenders were 
eligible for criminal court at age eighteen.86 
But the finding was not true across the board: 
the effects of jurisdictional age were condi-
tioned on the comparative likelihood of 
incarceration in the respective courts. Juvenile 
crime rates were lower in states with higher 
juvenile incarceration rates, and marginal 
increases in the juvenile incarceration rate 
had greater leverage on juvenile crime rates 
than did the age of jurisdiction. Levitt’s 
analysis suggests that strengthening the 
correctional response in the juvenile system 
can improve public safety without exacting 
the social and crime costs of transfer.
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Across all these studies, the great majority 
of the evidence agrees that young offenders 
seem unresponsive to sharp changes in the 
risk of harsher penalties and that the age at 
which they are exposed to these penalties 
seems to matter little if at all. The appetites 
of adolescents for crime and its rewards  
seem invariant to punishment threats. David 
Lee and Justin McCrary characterize young 
offenders as myopic, unfazed by the threat of 
short prison sentences and discounting the 
consequences and likelihood of longer ones.87 
It is hardly unreasonable to assume that 
knowledge of changes in the law diffuses effi-
ciently through adolescent peer networks that 
are, in effect, information markets to manage 
a variety of adolescent risk behaviors.88 Yet 
in these highly localized and efficient net-
works, teens seem to discount changes in the 
law’s consequences in a manner that typifies 
adolescent reasoning and planning. A gener-
alized change in the risk environment seems 
unable to leverage changes in behavior.
Specific Deterrence
As a policy matter, the critical test for transfer 
is whether it enhances public safety. Recent 
research on transfer suggests that, for youth 
with comparable individual characteristics 
and correctional experiences, recidivism rates 
are either the same or significantly higher for 
transferred youth than for youth retained in 
the juvenile court. Accordingly, studies on the 
specific deterrent effects of criminal court 
sanctions show no evidence of public safety 
benefits from transfer. 
Another single-state study, in Florida, com-
bined age of majority and changes in sanction-
ing probabilities to estimate the effects of 
reaching the age of majority on age-specific 
crime rates. Lee and McCrary used panel 
methods to estimate the probabilities of 
rearrest for a sample of youth arrested before 
age seventeen between 1989 and 2002 in 
Florida.89 The authors constructed complete 
criminal histories going back to the date of 
first arrest and tracked them over time, 
controlling for punishment experiences. 
Again, they found little change in offending 
rates once youth turned age eighteen and 
faced more severe and longer terms of 
punishment as adults. They also found no 
effects of transfer to criminal court. They 
concluded that none of the mechanisms to 
toughen punishment for adolescents— 
whether transfer to criminal court, or longer 
sentences or even aging out of the juvenile 
jurisdiction—show marginal deterrent effects. 
The Task Force on Community Preventive 
Services, a standing committee including 
policy experts from government, academia, 
and private research, reviewed seven studies 
and concluded that youth transferred to adult 
court subsequently commit violent crime at 
higher rates than do those retained in juvenile 
court.90 Figure 4, which is taken from the Task 
Force report, illustrates graphically the range 
of the effects of transfer on recidivism in sev-
eral of the studies. Some studies suggest that 
transfer to the criminal court worsens crimi-
nal behavior and increases public safety risks. 
Again, the consistency of the findings, across 
a variety of sampling, measurement, and ana-
lytic conditions, is rare in policy science. 
The studies typically compared court out-
comes and recidivism rates for matched 
groups of transferred and retained youth. 
Some studies compared the criminal records 
of similar groups of youth either from the 
same time period or from different time 
periods before and after law changes.91 
Some studies used designs that are similar to 
experiments to compare waived and retained 
youth. These designs are approximations of 
true experiments, where the youth in juvenile 
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and criminal court are matched on several 
factors, such as the number and severity of 
prior offenses, and then compared on their 
criminal records after they are sentenced 
and punished. Other studies compared youth 
from adjoining jurisdictions with different 
statutes.92 The studies also vary in how they 
test the effects of the different court juris-
dictions. Most limit their tests to a simple 
test of what happens in one court compared 
with the other, while some others control 
for what court the case is heard in and what 
correctional sentence the youth receives. The 
outcome measures sometimes are specific 
crimes, such as violence or drug offenses, and 
sometimes all types of crimes. The studies 
vary in the lengths of the follow-up periods, 
with some reporting short-term differences 
that disappear after several years.93 
How confident can we be in these studies  
and the conclusions of the Task Force? Some 
critics of these studies think that there are 
weaknesses in the designs that may under-
mine the conclusions. For example, most of 
the studies introduce selection biases that 
prevent a true comparison of the two types 
of proceedings and sanctions. That is, the 
process of selection for transfer—whether 
judicial, prosecutorial, or legislative—may 
be based on pre-existing indices for criminal 
propensity that may then affect the out-
comes. Accordingly, differences in the sam-
ples may reflect more about that pre-existing 
propensity than about the differential effects 
of court jurisdiction. Also, comparisons from 
one court jurisdiction to the next may intro-
duce important contextual influences that 
may interact with the deterrent effects of 
punishment.94 
Only a portion of the studies cited by the 
Task Force addressed these selection issues. 
Two studies of youth in Florida used different 
Figure 4. Comparison of Effects of Transfer on Recidivism Rates in Five Studies of Specific  
Deterrence
Note: Effects of transfer on re-arrests of transferred juveniles. (Results of one other study were not presented here because of com-
plex effect modification by initial offense and other status characteristics.)
Source: For detailed citations to these studies, see Andrea McGowan and others, “Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating 
the Transfer of Juveniles from the Juvenile Justice System to the Adult Justice System: A Report on Recommendations of the Task 
Force on Community Preventive Services,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 56, no. RR-9 (November 30, 2007).
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procedures to control for selection. Lawrence 
Winner and several colleagues matched cases 
in the juvenile and adult courts on seven  
criteria.95 The use of matching routines adds 
confidence to these studies and reflects well 
on the consistency of their findings with those 
of other studies lacking rigorous controls.96 
Matches were successful for the first six 
variables, but transfers including matches by 
race were less successful. Only two-thirds of 
the white transfers could be matched to white 
non-transfers, and only about half of the non-
white transfers could be matched to non-white 
non-transfers. When the race criterion was  
relaxed, successful matches were obtained 
in 92 percent of the cases. There were no 
controls for court or community context. 
Lonn Lanza-Kaduce and several colleagues97 
computed a risk index based on twelve items 
and used propensity score matching to adjust 
for selection effects in the transfer process. He 
was able to match 475 pairs overall and 315 
“best matched pairs” that excluded transferred 
youth whose criminal history was longer or 
more severe than a matched contemporary 
in the retained sample. The differences in 
recidivism rates using these two design strate-
gies produced similar results that both show 
substantially higher recidivism rates for trans-
ferred youth, particularly in the initial three to 
five years following sentencing.
A study by Fagan and another by Fagan and 
two colleagues compared recidivism rates 
among samples of youth recruited from New 
York City whose cases originated in the crimi-
nal court with samples from bordering areas 
in northeastern New Jersey whose cases were 
processed in the juvenile court.98 In each 
study, the researchers estimated a selection 
parameter, or a “propensity score,” to control 
for differences in the samples.99 The propen-
sity score was included as a predictor in the 
analyses of recidivism rates. 
Even among the few studies that address 
selection issues, findings are consistent and 
strong. When joined with other studies show-
ing similar findings, they offer robust evidence 
of the perverse effects of both wholesale and 
retail transfer to the criminal court. Moreover, 
these studies reject the notion that these  
effects are limited to the subset of transferred 
youth who are incarcerated in adult prisons. 
Fagan and Fagan and colleagues as well as 
Lee and McCrary, specifically test for incar-
ceration effects and find no evidence that 
either the fact of incarceration or its length 
significantly predicts recidivism. Several other 
studies made similar findings. Increasing the 
risk or length of confinement offers no return 
to crime control for transferred youth. 
Summary 
In her review of two decades of research 
on transfer, Donna Bishop condemns the 
“recent and substantial expansion of transfer” 
as harmful and ineffective.100 Richard Red-
ding says that “[t]he short-term benefits 
gained from transfer and imprisonment may 
be outweighed by the longer-term costs of 
(increased) criminal justice system process-
ing” from higher recidivism rates.101 Without 
exception the research evidence shows that 
policies promoting transfer of adolescents 
from juvenile to criminal court fail to deter 
crime among sanctioned juveniles and may 
even worsen public safety risks. The weight 
of empirical evidence strongly suggests  
that increasing the scope of transfer has no 
general deterrent effects on the incidence of 
serious juvenile crime or specific deterrent 
effects on the re-offending rates of trans-
ferred youth. In fact, compared with youth 
retained in juvenile court, youth prosecuted 
as adults had higher rates of rearrest for seri-
ous felony crimes such as robbery and assault. 
They were also rearrested more quickly and 
were more often returned to incarceration.
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Worse, the broad reach of new transfer laws 
and policies captures not only those youth 
whose crimes and reoffending risks may 
merit harsher punishment, but also many 
more who are neither chronic nor serious 
offenders, who pose little risk of future 
offending, and who seem to be damaged by 
their exposure to the adult court. Whatever 
the gains of short-term incapacitation, they 
are more than offset by the toxic effects of 
adult punishment for the larger group of 
adolescent offenders.
Principles for Transfer Policy 
The proliferation of promiscuous transfer 
regimes over the past three decades calls 
into question the very rationale for a juvenile 
court. The new legislative activism has rolled 
back the age at which maturity is assumed 
to a threshold that strains the credibility of 
the new laws themselves. But there is almost 
no evidence that justifies this decades-long 
experiment.
Three Strikes against the New Transfer
All scientific evidence suggests that transfer-
ring early adolescent youth to adult courts 
inverts assumptions about their cognitive 
and behavioral capacities before the law and 
in nearly every other age-graded social task. 
Wholesale transfer laws such as New York’s 
JO Law or California’s Proposition 21 assume 
a level of maturity and responsibility among 
young adolescents that is sharply at odds with 
new social and scientific facts. To be sure, 
retributive interests benefit from wholesale 
transfer regimes, but at the cost of vastly 
multiplying the number of individual injus-
tices from proportionality miscalculations.102
The new transfer measures fail to enhance 
public safety, despite repeated assertions to 
the contrary by prosecutors and legislators. 
Instead, prosecuting adolescents as adults, no 
matter what the pathway to adult court, leads 
to more, not less, crime, inviting avoidable 
public safety risks. More youth, it is true, are 
incapacitated for longer periods once in the 
criminal court—in many instances, for the 
rest of their lives. Yet there is no evidence 
that incarcerating minors for any length of 
time deters crime either by those locked up 
or by others. 
Had the large-scale legal mobilization to 
increase transfer been subject to federal (and 
university) standards for the ethical treatment 
of human subjects, it would have been shut 
down long ago. One might argue that the 
benefits of penal proportionality and incapac-
itation justify the overreach in moving youth 
to adult court, but even here, the calculus 
fails. Transfer, whether retail or wholesale, 
runs a high risk of exposing to harm not just 
its subjects, but also the public that hosts 
these measures. These harms are multiplied 
by the corrosive effects of a criminal record 
on the possibility of reformation or prosocial 
development. A transfer regime calibrated 
at age seventeen may overreach or under-
reach at the margins, but transfer policies 
that move youth into criminal court at age 
sixteen will categorically be overreaching and 
Without exception the  
research evidence shows that 
policies promoting transfer 
of adolescents from juvenile 
to criminal court fail to deter 
crime among sanctioned  
juveniles and may even  
worsen public safety risks.
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weighted toward over-punishment. These 
policies endure in the face of good evidence 
of the possibility of such harms, perhaps 
animated by deep biases about youth among 
legislators if not the public.103 The racial skew 
in transfer and its effects, a result in part of 
the conflation of youth crime and race in the 
popular and political imagination,104 multi-
plies the ethical tensions in transfer policy.
The Politics of Transfer and the  
Politics of Crime
Policymakers have taken notice of the robust 
evidence on the negative effects of transfer, 
creating a political space for reform as advo-
cates and reformers have pushed back against 
expanded transfer. Connecticut passed legisla-
tion in July 2007 to raise the age of majority 
incrementally from age sixteen to age eighteen 
by 2010. In the past two years, legislators in 
Missouri, Illinois, and New Hampshire have 
had extensive debates over whether to raise 
the age to eighteen. Legislators in North 
Carolina have convened hearings and formed 
a study commission to address this issue.105 
The debates focus less on whether to raise the 
age than on the strategies and details of how 
to do so effectively. The research evidence on 
transfer and the decrease in serious juvenile 
crime have convinced most legislators, policy-
makers, practitioners, and other stakeholders 
that eighteen may yet again be the appropriate 
age for juvenile court jurisdiction.
Reformers face a difficult task. Transfer and 
youth policy raise complex questions that are 
not just about youth crime. Transfer is one 
front in a longstanding tension between the 
judiciary and other branches of government 
during successive legislative efforts to control 
crime. It is also an important symbolic front 
in showing toughness on crime. The general 
hostility toward judges that was evident in the 
overall narrowing of judicial discretion—such 
as the adoption of sentencing guidelines for 
adults that set minimum or fixed sentences—
also extended to the juvenile court, where 
measures to expand transfer curtailed judicial 
discretion. The sharp restriction of judicial 
authority in favor of enhanced prosecutorial 
power (as in Proposition 21) or legislative 
authority (as in the New York JO Law) 
resulted in the expansion of prosecutorial 
power at the expense of judicial authority. 
The accretion of authority to prosecutors in 
this regime is clear: the prosecutor has the 
unreviewable discretion to select charges 
and, in turn, to select jurisdiction. Although 
direct file provisions offer some degree of 
transparency, exclusion statutes (which 
account for a large number of transfers)  
offer none.
Restoring Principle to the  
Transfer Debate
The debate about transfer to date has been 
based neither on principle nor on policy, but 
on the need for “toughness.”106 It is about the 
substitution of toughness for principle. No 
scholar or practitioner or advocate denies that 
it is sometimes necessary to transfer some 
adolescents to criminal court. The public 
must be protected from dangerous youth  
who are not likely to be helped by treatment-
oriented or supervisory sanctions. An unre-
buttable assumption of immaturity for all 
robbery suspects younger than age eighteen 
would be as silly as an unrebuttable assump-
tion of their maturity at fourteen. But delin-
quent youth also must be protected from 
the overreach of wholesale waiver. And the 
reduced decision-making capacity of juveniles 
provides a principled justification for fine-
tuning the borders of the juvenile justice 
system to avoid unnecessary risk.
Setting these boundaries poses a dilemma  
for lawmakers that they simply ignore when 
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they retreat to the simplistic overreach of 
legislative exclusion or cede discretion to 
(elected) prosecutors. Developing transfer 
policy, both calibrating the threshold itself 
and devising the mechanism for crossing it, 
involves weighing competing risks. Two types 
of error lie in wait. One is overpredicting  
the likelihood of juveniles’ offending. The 
other is underpredicting recidivism risks.  
The two types of predictions are linked, and 
evaluating waiver or transfer as public policy 
requires considering both types of risk. Such 
is the ethical responsibility of the regulator.107 
Principles for transfer can produce hard 
choices and conflicting results. A legislative 
waiver regime may produce fewer racial dis-
parities for youth under the criminal law than 
does individual waiver by judges. But legisla-
tive waiver raises substantial risks and social 
costs.108 Are longer sentences in the juvenile 
court preferable to shorter sentences in the 
criminal courts? When we pile on redundant 
reforms—blended sentences, presumptive 
transfer, longer juvenile court sentences—do 
the cumulative and cascading effects produce 
the intended consequences, or does some 
less desirable outcome develop? 
The future of reform depends on the pros-
pects for restoring principle and discipline to 
the legislative debate. The weight of evidence 
points toward returning to juvenile court 
judges the discretion to select juveniles for 
transfer. The evidence also points toward 
basing that selection on more criteria than 
age and offense. Using Kent-like criteria and 
new scientific knowledge of adolescent 
development in an open and transparent 
forum, judges, who are less influenced than 
legislators by the politics of crime and by 
electoral pressures, should be able to decide 
which adolescents should be transferred.109 A 
jurisprudence of discretionary decision 
making on transfer would also promote two 
ancillary goals. It would restore the account-
ability that is diffused when legislators 
surgically remove entire classes of offenders 
from the juvenile court. And it would take 
seriously the responsibility for mistakes on 
both sides of the decision threshold.
Returning to discretionary transfer rather 
than “wholesale waiver” also would minimize 
harm by limiting the number of youth sub-
jected to criminal court prosecution while 
identifying those whose plasticity warrants 
juvenile court intervention. Yet it would also 
maintain proportional punishment for ado-
lescents whose crimes are too serious to be 
adjudicated in the juvenile court.
A now extensive portfolio of empirical  
research suggests that past attempts to select 
youth individually for transfer have often 
failed to identify the most serious offenders 
and have also reinforced racial discrimina-
tion.110 More careful screening is crucial. 
New evidence on the dangers of wholesale 
transfer suggests that the ethical regulator 
must balance the risk of two types of error, 
not just the risks of leniency that motivate 
contemporary statutes and practices. Strong 
commitments to transparency and ongoing 
analysis of the patterns and rationales for 
such decisions can enable judges and other 
juvenile justice stakeholders to calibrate 
where the borders should be set and to track 
and measure the performance of those mak-
ing transfer decisions. 
Declining crime rates, the intellectual and 
political exhaustion of the “toughness” para-
digm in juvenile justice, and new gains in the 
science of adolescent development have con-
verged to create an opportunity for reform. 
Opening the transfer process to regulation 
and deliberation can lay the foundation for 
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more effective and principled policies. While 
the law has moved toward waiving increas-
ingly younger teens to adult criminal court, 
social and biological evidence suggests moving 
in the other direction. Perhaps it’s time for the 
law to change course and follow the science.
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